Authenticating application legitimacy

ABSTRACT

Facilities are provided herein to address application phishing by determining whether an application is a legitimate application it purports to be. Optical code(s) are displayed on a display device in association with an application to be authenticated for a user as being a legitimate application. Based on imaging the optical code(s) using a camera of a device of a user, data of the optical code(s) are obtained. It is automatically determines, based on the obtained data of the optical code(s), whether the application to be authenticated is authenticated as being the legitimate application, and based on this, an indication of whether the application is authenticated as being the legitimate application is provided for the user by the device.

BACKGROUND

Phishing refers to an attempt to obtain sensitive information from auser who is under a mistaken belief that he or she is providing theinformation to a different entity. A common phishing scenario involves amalicious entity imitating the appearance of a legitimate entity throughemails or websites. The malicious entity then prompts users forsensitive information such as their usernames and passwords. Althoughattempts have been made to curb phishing practices, their effectivenessvaries.

SUMMARY

Shortcomings of the prior art are overcome and additional advantages areprovided through the provision of a method that includes obtaining,based on imaging at least one optical code using a camera of a device ofa user, data of the at least one optical code, the at least one opticalcode being displayed on a display device in association with anapplication to be authenticated for the user as being a legitimateapplication; automatically determining, based on the obtained data ofthe at least one optical code, whether the application to beauthenticated is authenticated as being the legitimate application; andproviding for the user, by the device of the user, based on theautomatically determining, an indication of whether the application tobe authenticated is authenticated as being the legitimate application.

Further, a computer program product including a computer readablestorage medium readable by a processor and storing instructions forexecution by the processor is provided for performing a method thatincludes: obtaining, based on imaging at least one optical code using acamera of a device of a user, data of the at least one optical code, theat least one optical code being displayed on a display device inassociation with an application to be authenticated for the user asbeing a legitimate application; automatically determining, based on theobtained data of the at least one optical code, whether the applicationto be authenticated is authenticated as being the legitimateapplication; and providing for the user, by the device of the user,based on the automatically determining, an indication of whether theapplication to be authenticated is authenticated as being the legitimateapplication.

Yet further, a computer system is provided that includes a memory and aprocessor in communications with the memory, wherein the computer systemis configured to perform a method including: obtaining, based on imagingat least one optical code using a camera of a device of a user, data ofthe at least one optical code, the at least one optical code beingdisplayed on a display device in association with an application to beauthenticated for the user as being a legitimate application;automatically determining, based on the obtained data of the at leastone optical code, whether the application to be authenticated isauthenticated as being the legitimate application; and providing for theuser, by the device of the user, based on the automatically determining,an indication of whether the application to be authenticated isauthenticated as being the legitimate application.

Additional features and advantages are realized through the conceptsdescribed herein.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Aspects of the present invention are particularly pointed out anddistinctly claimed as examples in the claims at the conclusion of thespecification. The foregoing and other objects, features, and advantagesof the invention are apparent from the following detailed descriptiontaken in conjunction with the accompanying drawings in which:

FIG. 1 depicts an example application interface incorporatinguser-specific application indicators;

FIG. 2 depicts an example process to facilitate authentication of anapplication as being a legitimate application, in accordance withaspects described herein;

FIG. 3 depicts an example application interface incorporating a staticQR code to facilitate authentication of an application as being alegitimate application, in accordance with aspects described herein;

FIG. 4 depicts an example application interface incorporating a dynamicQR code to facilitate authentication of an application as being alegitimate application, in accordance with aspects described herein;

FIG. 5 depicts an example process to launch phishing detection software,in accordance with aspects described herein;

FIG. 6 depicts an example process to authenticate an application asbeing a legitimate application, in accordance with aspects describedherein;

FIG. 7 depicts an example of a computer system to incorporate and useaspects described herein; and

FIG. 8 depicts an example of a wearable device to perform one or moreaspects described herein;

FIG. 9 depicts one embodiment of a computer program product.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

Aspects described herein address application (“app”) phishing, whichrefers to the practice of masquerading as one application—a legitimateapplication—by another application. More specifically, imagingcapabilities such as those of wearable devices are leveraged forauthenticating an application purporting to be another, legitimateapplication.

Recent developments in computer technology have made it increasinglyconvenient to incorporate small, internet-connected devices into oureveryday lives. Example devices include battery-powered, generallyhandheld (or smaller) devices that are carried or worn by the user. Thisso-called “wearable technology” serves practical purposes by providingrelevant information based on context, helping users stay organized,facilitating communication with others, and tracking user healthmarkers, as examples. Specific examples of wearable technology includeGoogle Glass™ (offered by Google Inc., Mountain View, Calif., USA) andsmartwatches, such as those offered by Samsung Group (Suwon, SouthKorea) and LG Corporation (Seoul, South Korea).

According to aspects described herein, indications as to whether amobile, web, or other type of application is the legitimate applicationit purports to be are provided to users via a wearable (or other) userdevice, referred to herein as a notifying device. This is used toprevent application phishing attacks by informing the user whether thedisplayed application is authentic. The user may expect an indication oflegitimacy from the device and if none is provided, then the user canrefrain from entering sensitive information and take remedial measuresto address the compromise. This may be useful for assuring legitimacy ofapplications executing on any type of computer system, such as asmartphone, tablet, other types of mobile device, personal computer,laptop, etc., as well as browser-based web-applications.

Application phishing attempts to trick a user into believing that amalicious application with which he or she is working is a legitimateapplication. The malicious application often looks very similar oridentical to the original legitimate application, making it difficult orimpossible for the user to recognize based on looks alone that theapplication is not the legitimate application. In the mobile devicecontext, malicious applications can find their way to user devices inany of several ways. A malicious application can try to uninstall orconceal a legitimate application it attempts to replace so that a userlaunching the application actually unknowingly launches the maliciousapplication. Mobile application phishing is commonly used to stealusernames, passwords, or personal identification numbers that legitimateapplications including banking or email applications commonly requirefor security reasons.

Application phishing is considered different from application tampering,which involves tampering with or modifying code of a legitimateapplication to cause the legitimate application to behave differently.Application phishing does not necessarily tamper with the legitimateapplication. Instead, the malicious application may be a completelyseparate program that prominently places itself in front of the user sothe user believes it to be the legitimate application. Applicationphishing arises when a user unknowingly launches a look-alikeapplication or website, for instance by clicked a wrong icon or URL, andit relies on end users not being able to differentiate the legitimateapplication from the launched malicious application.

Addressing the problem of application phishing focuses on authenticatingan application as being legitimate. This is different from multi-factorauthentication (MFA), such as two-factor authentication, which focuseson authenticating users through user involvement. MFA solutions (SMSbased, barcode based, etc.) do not prevent application phishing. Forexample, assume a user is working in a malicious application instead ofthe legitimate app. The malicious application can imitate the MFAverification by prompting the user for a one-time password (OTP)(possibly after sending it to the user's mobile device as a SMSverification code which is a common MFA practice), and, regardless ofthe code the user types into the malicious app on the MFA screen,display a message that verification is successful. The user believesthat the application is legitimate based on the fake MFA verificationand provides the sensitive information to the malicious application.

Application phishing detection, on the other hand, is directed toapplication authentication—identifying that the application is notlegitimate to begin with, and, in accordance with aspects describedherein, may not require any user involvement to identifying applicationlegitimacy. As described herein, phishing detection software (PDS) maybe started at device boot and automatically begin checking legitimacy ofa launched application. The device on which the PDS runs may refer to adevice separate from the one on which the application runs. Forinstance, the user's smartphone may execute the application, while aseparate device, such as a wearable device, executes the PDS software.For purposes of description herein, the device running the PDS andproviding an indication as to legitimacy of an application is referredto as the notifying device, and the system on which the application islaunched is referred to as the application device or system. In someembodiments, the notifying device and application device are the samedevice or system, or are components of the same device, though inexamples described herein they are separate computer systems.

As described below, detection of an optical code such as one presentedby a launched program can trigger a check by the PDS for applicationlegitimacy. An example type of optical code used for descriptionpurposes throughout this application is a matrix barcode, which is aform of barcode, an example of which is commonly referred to as a “QuickResponse” or “QR” code (QR Code is a registered trademark of Denso WaveIncorporated, a subsidiary of Denso Corporation, Kariya, Japan). Thelegitimate application can therefore be configured to present opticalcode(s) to facilitate application authentication, and this expectedbehavior of the legitimate application can be known to, and expected by,the users. A malicious application that does not display an appropriateoptical code will not necessarily invoke this PDS checking, but the usercan nevertheless understand and/or receive a notification that theapplication is malicious (as the legitimate application is to have a QRcode next to login button, for instance).

In other examples, PDS may reside in the same device that launches andpresents the application. In these aspects, pixels of the display buffermay be obtained or “ripped” in a process known as graphical userinterface (GUI) ripping, to parse out the QR code(s) for furtherprocessing. When PDS of this type is utilized on a mobile device, theprocessing is likely to require root access or jail-break permissionsfor the device.

Barcode-based one-time password authentication to authenticate users maybe incorporated into mobile applications. Aspects described herein,however, differ from traditional QR code authentication, since theconsiderations to address application phishing are different from thoseof barcode-based authentication used for authenticating users.

The PDS provides an easy user experience to check and provide anindication of application legitimacy when a user opens an application ona mobile device, in a web browser, or any other computer system. Areal-time, practically instantaneous indication of applicationlegitimacy or illegitimacy may be provided by the user's notifyingdevice, for instance by the display or other output thereof. Theindication can be non-intrusive and easily understandable, providing ahands-free experience with no additional steps required by the user.

There are three primary types of application phishing. The first is aforwarding attack whereby a user clicks an overlaid button that opens amalicious application screen instead of the legitimate applicationscreen. In a background attack, a phishing application runs in thebackground and detects when a user attempts to open a legitimateapplication. This may be detected through application programminginterface (API) calls, for instance. The malicious application maylaunch at that time and present itself to the user as the legitimateapplication. The third type of application phishing is a notificationattack in which an attacker provides a fake notification window and asksthe user to enter his or her credentials.

No matter the type of application phishing, approaches thus far areunable to reliably prevent application phishing. The most widely usedapproach involves application indicators, in which a user pre-enrolls apersonalized image and/or message. Whenever the user logs into theapplication, the enrolled personalized image and/or message ispresented. An example is shown in FIG. 1. Application interface 100 ispresented on launch of the application or upon the user navigating to awebsite that requires a login. In the example of FIG. 1, the applicationis a banking application. The application indicators in FIG. 1 includean image 102 and message 104 that are presented. The image and messagecome from the application server (e.g. of the bank in this example), soa malicious application should not have access to the correct indicatorsfor this particular user. Thus, the user is able to differentiate alegitimate application from a malicious application based on whethercorrect application indicator(s) are presented.

This approach has several pitfalls, the primary one of which involvessnapshot-based phishing. Various known snapshot mechanisms, typicallyinstalled as local software running in the background of a system, canrelatively easily steal the user's image and message when the user logsinto the legitimate application. Screen scraping, for instance, may beused to isolate the image and message from the interface that the useruses to log into the legitimate application. The isolated image/messagecan then be incorporated into a spoofed login screen of a maliciousapplication. Username-indicator pairs can be aggregated and stored in adatabase that is checked by a malicious application when phishing. So,in the same way a legitimate application obtains a user's applicationindicator(s) from a remote server when the user attempts a login to thelegitimate application, a malicious application could also obtain theseapplication indicator(s) dynamically from a backend database of stolenusername-indicator pairs and present them to the user who unknowinglyaccepts that the application is the legitimate application.

Some approaches embed timestamp information or other form of dynamicwatermark against the application indicator images to prevent snapshottechniques, however it is nonetheless the responsibility of the users toverify the image and the watermarked timestamp, which can be verydifficult from the user perspective.

Accordingly, what is needed are facilities to assist end users withautomated verification of application legitimacy to help preventapplication phishing. According to aspects described herein, wearable orother devices are configured to automatically determine and indicate toa user whether a launched application purporting to be a legitimateapplication is authenticated as being the legitimate application, orinstead is determined to be malicious. This is designed to be resilienteven to snapshot-based phishing.

Examples used in verifying authenticity of an application are presentedwith reference to FIGS. 2-4. In these examples, the optical codes arematrix barcodes (QR codes), though an optical code can be anyoptically-recognizable item(s) that can encode data. FIG. 2 depicts anexample overall process and begins with the launch of phishing detectionsoftware during boot of the user's device (202). This may be done afterfirst checking and verifying a digital signature of the PDS. In thisregard, the PDS can be controlled by the operating system (orlower-level control, such as a hypervisor) of the notifying device inorder to provide initial security for the PDS itself. Various techniquesmay be used to minimize power consumption attributable to the backgroundPDS.

At some point, an application to be authenticated is launched (204)either directly by a user or otherwise, such as by clicking an icon ornavigating to a webpage hosting a web application, as examples. When theapplication presents the login interface, the user enters his/herusername or account specifier (206), if not already saved andautomatically recognized by the application on startup. The applicationthen displays, on the basis of this username/specifier, a static QR code(208), as shown in FIG. 3. The example application interface 300 of FIG.3 presents static QR code 306. Static QR code 306 can encode any desireddata items. In some embodiments, it encodes (i) an applicationidentifier that can uniquely identify the application to the deviceexecuting the application and/or to the notifying device, the deviceperforming authentication processing described herein, or a trustedauthentication entity as described herein, as examples, (ii) anapplication user indicator, and/or (iii) address identifier for atrusted authentication entity, as examples. Though this information isencoded into the optical code, some or all of this information may alsobe in encrypted form, to be decrypted after being decoded.

The application user indicator can serve as a user identity for theuser—a unique mapping between the user and the specific user identitythat is registered with the trusted authentication entity associatedwith the legitimate application (the bank's authentication entity, inthis example). For increased security, this application user indicatormay purposely be concealed or otherwise difficult for a malicious partyto imitate. As an example, the application user indicator may be anidentifier that a user enters or selects, or is assigned, during apre-enrollment with the bank.

In some embodiments, some/all of the data encoded in the static QR codeis maintained at the trusted authentication entity, such as the bankserver for the banking application of FIG. 3, and retrieved on demand orbeforehand and built into the static QR code for presentation onapplication launch. Thus, in some examples, the user launches theapplication and enters his/her username at which point the applicationis to communicate to the bank server (in this example) to pull thestatic QR code (or data used by the system executing the application toconstruct the static QR code) and display it for the user. If at thispoint the application fails to display any QR code at all, the user mayimmediately recognize that the application is not the legitimateapplication.

During this process, the PDS running in a wearable device of the user(or other device with imaging capability) may continuously orperiodically leverage a camera, scanner, or other imaging system of thedevice to scan the display on which the application login interface ispresented (e.g. the screen of the application device, such as the user'ssmartphone). In a specific example, the users wears a wearable devicesuch as the example wearable device as shown in FIG. 8 that has a camerathat images the screen of the user's smartphone. The PDS then detectsthe static QR code (210) and decodes/decrypts it (212).

In some examples, the PDS will start checking the authenticity of theapplication (described below) as soon as it detects a QR code on anapplication launch/login screen. The checking can happen in thebackground so that PDS does not disrupt the user. Additionally oralternatively, PDS software runs in the background and continuously orperiodically assesses whether or not an application legitimacy check isneeded for an encountered optical code, which may be an optical codepresented by an application for legitimacy checking, or may be presentedby an application for other reasons unrelated to legitimacy checking.The QR code itself might contain or embed a pattern, marker or other cuefor the PDS to invoke the application legitimacy checking

At this point the PDS, having imaged the QR code, invokes comparisonprocessing to compare the obtained QR code and/or data decoded therefromwith legitimate data, such as data it received from a trustedauthentication entity. In some embodiments, the PDS is preconfiguredwith the legitimate data, which may be a QR code (in this example) ormay be other data such as an application user indicator, to which the QRcode or data decoded therefrom is compared in order to assess whetherthe application is legitimate. In some embodiments, the PDS securelystores a QR code and compares the obtained QR code, imaged from thedisplay of the application device, to the stored QR code. Additionallyor alternatively, the imaged QR code may be decoded to obtain data ofthe QR code, and that data may be compared to the stored data to assessapplication legitimacy. In other embodiments, the PDS sends obtainedoptical code data, such as a representation of the QR code itself ordata decoded from the QR code, to a trusted authentication entity, thecomparison is performed by that entity, and an indication as to whetherthe application is the legitimate application is provided back to thePDS

In some examples, the application user indicator is provided orascertained based on an active user profile of the computer system onwhich the application is launched. The user profile may serve to informthe system, e.g. the PDS, of the particular user profile, which in turnis used by the PDS to determine the appropriate application userindicator to expect from the optical code, or alternatively is providedto the trusted authentication entity to determine the appropriateapplication user indicator to expect from the optical code in the casethat this aspects of validation is performed by the trustedauthentication entity.

As noted above, the QR code can encode an application identifier and/oridentifier of a trusted authentication entity, such as a bank serverusing the example of FIG. 3, to be used in authenticating theapplication as being the legitimate application. As before, the encodeddata may an encoded form of encrypted data. The identification may berecognized by the PDS and may itself serve as an indication ofapplication legitimacy. The QR code may embed a uniform resource locator(URL), for instance, indicating the address of the trustedauthentication entity and the PDS may check that against a whitelist ofURLs, perhaps indexed by the legitimate application identifier that eachwhitelisted URL corresponds to. The URL may be the address of thetrusted verification entity, i.e. to which data of an optical code is tobe provided for verification, or from which trusted data for comparisonagainst an optical code is received. In both scenarios, the URL servesas an indicator that authentication is being based on using the realserver (trusted authentication entity) associated with the legitimateapplication, to help ensure that a spoofed server is not being used forauthentication.

Returning to FIG. 2, after the QR code is decoded/decrypted (212), theprocess continues by determining whether the static QR code is invalid(214), for instance fails to convey a proper user identity or otherwisefails to convey what is expected from a static QR code presented by thelegitimate application at this stage. If so, the process ends with theapplication not being authenticated as being the legitimate application.

Up to this point in the process of FIG. 2, there are at least twosafeguards against application phishing as assisted by optically imagingthe display of the application device on which the application islaunched: (i) the mere presence of an optical code displayed inassociation with an application to be authenticated, and (ii) if such anoptical code is present, a comparison of the data of the optical code toexpected data, to determine whether the optical code presented is validor invalid. Thus, a provisional indication of authenticity of theapplication is provided. However, this provisional indication may besubject to modification based on further processing as described herein.Even a hacked application might be able to build a username-based orother request and send it to a legitimate backend trusted authenticationserver, such as the bank server in the above example. Unless trustedhandshaking is involved in this communication, the bank server mayunknowingly provide the legitimate static optical code (or other data)to the illegitimate application, which can display a static optical codeusing that data and expect it to be verified as valid by the PDS.

Accordingly, if it is determined at inquiry (214) that the staticoptical code is not invalid, based on, for instance, a case in whichthere is a match between the static QR code (or data encoded thereby)and expected data (an expected QR code or expected application userindicator, for instance), this is not necessarily a definite indicationthat the application is legitimate. The authentication processingcontinues to a next phase involving dynamically generated optical codedata. To initiate this phase, the PDS on the user's wearable (or othernotifying) device can notify the trusted authentication entity, e.g.bank server, at which point the trusted authentication entitydynamically generates optical code data. The dynamically generatedoptical code data may be an optical code itself (i.e. a binaryrepresentation of the code) or may be data used by another entity suchas a legitimate application to generate an optical code, as examples.The dynamically generated optical code data is provided separately toboth the PDS and the legitimate application for display of a dynamicoptical code. There may exist a trusted communication channel betweenthe backend trusted authentication entity and the legitimate applicationthrough which the optical code data is provided to the legitimateapplication. Thus, the dynamically generated optical code data mayaccordingly be used to generate a dynamic optical code (dynamic QR code)(216). The dynamic QR code may be a random and unique QR code, impartingthe dynamic nature to the code, in contrast to the static QR codedescribed previously that in some embodiments follows a set standard orformula in terms of what information it carries and typically will notchange each time it is presented.

In one example, the dynamically generated optical code data provided bythe trusted authentication entity to the legitimate application and thePDS is a dynamic QR code itself. In other examples, the dynamicallygenerated optical code data provided to one or both entities is dataused by the legitimate application and/or PDS to generate the dynamic QRcode.

In embodiments above, the trusted authentication entity, e.g. bankserver, dynamically generates the optical code data and provides it tothe user's notifying device (wearable or other device), and to thelegitimate application installed on the user's application device. Thebank server may be assumed to be a trusted, uncompromised component andthe seed value(s) for the generation, as well as the generatoralgorithm(s) used internally, may be unknown and undiscoverable to theoutside world. The bank server could modify the random QR code generatoralgorithm(s) and/or their seed value(s) periodically for enhancedsecurity. By way of specific example for illustration purposes, anexample QR code (input mode: Numeric Only) may have 7089 characters, inwhich case the generator can generate N=10⁷⁰⁸⁹ unique QR codes. Theprobability that a hacker is able to coincidentally generate a unique QRcode generated at random under this scenario is 1/(N²), assuming auniform distribution, which is practically a guaranteed preventionagainst a snapshot-based phishing attack against this technique.

In alternative embodiments, the notifying device itself could generatethe dynamically generated optical code data, such as the dynamic QR codeor the data to be used by the application to generate the QR code, forinstance using a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). The notifyingdevice could then send the dynamically generated optical code datadirectly to the legitimate application on the application device througha secure channel. The PDS may become aware of the legitimate applicationexecuting on the application device by way of a pre-enrollment phase inwhich the two establish a secure way of communicating. After the staticQR code phase passes, the wearable device may generate the dynamicallygenerated optical code data and provide it directly to the legitimateapplication through a near-field or network connection between the two,e.g. for display of the dynamic QR code. As an alternative to providingthe dynamically generated optical code data directly to the legitimateapplication, the wearable device could instead send it to the trustedauthentication entity for provision to the legitimate application.

The legitimate application is configured to receive dynamicallygenerated optical code data, generate the dynamic QR code (if notalready part of the received optical code data), and display the dynamicQR code. An example of such a display is provided in FIG. 4. In thisexample, the legitimate application displays the dynamic QR code in thesame widget where the static QR code was previously displayed (FIG. 3).The example application interface 400 of FIG. 4 presents dynamic QR code408. The notifying device by way of the PDS and/or other software canscan/image the dynamic QR code and compare (FIG. 2, #218) it against thedynamically generated optical code data obtained either from the trustedapplication entity or from generating it itself. The comparison mayinclude decoding the dynamic QR code and decrypting encrypted datathereof to obtain the data that is to be compared to the trusteddynamically generated optical code data.

From a security standpoint it may be desired for the comparison to occurat the trusted authentication entity, in which case the PDS can obtainthe optical code data based on imaging the application interface andprovide the data to the trusted authentication entity to perform thecomparison to the trusted dynamically generated optical code data. Inthis case the dynamically generated optical code data need not beprovided from the trusted authentication entity to the PDS or otherentity. In contrast, from a user experience point of view, moving asmuch of the process as possible to the notifying device lessens relianceon an active network connection (e.g. to the trusted authenticationentity), albeit with the tradeoff of increased energy consumption.

The process of FIG. 2 continues by determining whether the dynamic QRcode is invalid (220). Invalidity refers to the dynamic QR code beingincorrect in the sense that it does not convey or match what is expectedfrom a dynamic QR code presented by the legitimate application, forinstance fails to convey some or all of the trusted dynamicallygenerated optical code data that was provided to the legitimateapplication and is expected to presented by the launched application nowbeing authenticated.

If the dynamic QR code is invalid, the process ends (in one example byproviding an indication of invalidity as described below). If thedynamic QR code is valid, then the application is considered to beauthenticated as being the legitimate application it purports to be.This is because the dynamically generated optical code data is deliveredsecurely only to the legitimate application in the application device,and therefore a malicious application will not have that data tocorrectly spoof the application. In other words, the assurance oflegitimacy is premised on the fact that the dynamically generatedoptical code data was provided to the legitimate application, and thatthe application purporting to be the legitimate application presented adynamic QR code that could, with near certainty, be built only if thatapplication possessed the dynamically generated optical code data. Theconclusion is that if the application presents a dynamic QR code thatmatches with the trusted dynamically generated optical code data, thenthe application must be the legitimate application.

The notifying device can indicate or notify the user of the result ofthe authentication process, which may be accomplished using any suitableindication, such as a visual, haptic, and/or audible indication. As aspecific example, if the process determines that the application isauthenticated as being the legitimate application, the notifying devicedisplays a green light in its display screen to inform the user that theapplication has been authenticated as being the legitimate application.If the process instead determines that the application is notauthenticated as being the legitimate application, the notifying devicedisplays a red light in its display screen to inform the user that theapplication has not been authenticated as being the legitimateapplication, e.g. that it is a malicious application.

As an enhancement, indications can be given to the user beginning at anyprior point in the process of FIG. 2. For instance, upon PDS detecting alaunch of an application and/or that a launched application is to beauthenticated as being legitimate, a constant or periodic indication(such as a red light) may be given to the user to indicate thatapplication legitimacy checking is occurring and/or the application hasnot yet been authenticated as being legitimate. If the application isauthenticated as being legitimate, then the indication can change (e.g.to a green light) to inform the user that it is safe to proceed usingthe application on the basis that it was authorized as being thelegitimate application. If the application is not authenticated as beinglegitimate, then the indication can remain as is and/or may take anotherform that indicates that the legitimacy authentication process has endedand the application has affirmatively been determined not to beauthenticated as the legitimate application.

After the legitimacy of the application is verified as described above,the user can provide any additional security credentials to fully loginto the application. In the examples of FIGS. 3 & 4, the user can enterhis/her password or pin 410. The process of FIG. 2 therefore proceeds toreceive the user's password and authenticate the user (222).

The following provides some additional possible aspects of the phishingdetection software, which in some embodiments executes on the notifyingdevice such as a wearable device of the user.

-   -   Phishing detection software executing on an eye gadget wearable        device (FIG. 8) having a camera and processing capability can        take on the visual perspective of the user to image the optical        code(s) and determine whether the displayed application is        malicious or legitimate;    -   There are various ways to help secure the phishing detection        software against tampering. Implementing data obfuscation, a        trusted execution environment (TEE), secure storage, and/or        end-point security are examples. Thus the phishing detection        software itself may be implemented using safeguards that help        avoid phishing or other attacks again the PDS;    -   Phishing detection software that runs on a wearable device can        be started by the operating system of the wearable device absent        user involvement or intervention, to help prevent phishing or        other attacks;    -   The operating system can launch the phishing detection software        during its boot and after verifying the digital signature of the        PDS, to ensure the PDS has not been compromised;    -   Phishing detection software can start checking the authenticity        of any application as soon as the PDS detects an optical code in        an application presented on the display of the application        device. This checking can happen in the background. The PDS can        run as a background application and monitor for presence of an        optical code in an imaging space proximate (such as in front of        a camera of) the application device, and can trigger the        checking based on detecting an optical code, or on detecting an        optical code and at least partially processing it to obtain an        indication that it is an optical code for application legitimacy        authentication. The background execution may prevent disturbance        of the user experience (as the optical code that was imaged may        be embedded into other types of applications for some purposes        other than for application legitimacy authentication).

Aspects described herein can effectively address application phishingand associated malicious activity. According to aspects describedherein, static and/or dynamic optical code(s) may be leveraged forapplication authentication. Even if a malicious entity successfullysnapshots a static optical code and displays it in a maliciousapplication to cheat a user, a second phase involving dynamicallygenerated optical code data can detect an invalid dynamic optical codethat is delivered to the legitimate application but not other (e.g.malicious) applications. The probability of a malicious entitycoincidentally generating and presenting the same dynamic optical codeas was generated and provided to the legitimate application on-demandduring application verification is extremely unlikely and virtuallyimpossible.

In accordance with some embodiments described herein, the phishingdetection software in the notifying device is configured to communicatewith any corresponding legitimate application by recognizing anapplication identifier retrieved from, e.g., a static optical codeinitially presented by the launched application. Mapping(s) for the PDSbetween legitimate application(s) and their respective applicationidentifier(s) may be done in a pre-enrollment phase to apprise the PDSof the correct process identifier (PID) or package name of thelegitimate application installed on the application device in order tofacilitate communication between the two based on the applicationidentifier retrieved from a static optical code. Additionally oralternatively, this communication may take place between the PDS and thelegitimate applications through the trusted authentication entity, whichmay be a remote system in communication with the notifying device acrossnetwork(s) or other communication links.

Accordingly, FIGS. 5 & 6 depict example processes in accordance withaspects described herein. FIG. 5 depicts an example process to launchphishing detection software, in accordance with aspects describedherein. This process may be performed by a computer system, such as auser device, and more specifically a notifying device as describedherein, which may be a wearable device, as an example. The processbegins during boot of a user device and triggers a check of a digitalsignature of the phishing detection software (PDS) of the user device(502). An altered digital signature from what is expected can indicatetampering with the software. The process then determines whether thesignature is verified (504). If not, the process ends, perhaps with anotification to the user that PDS could not be verified. Otherwise, ifverified, the process launches the PDS (506) to initiate its execution.

At this point or some time thereafter, a process is performed forauthenticating an application as being a legitimate application itpurports to be. An example such process is depicted in FIG. 6. In someembodiments the process is performed based on detecting an optical code.In this regard, the PDS may be an application running as a backgroundapplication of the user device and may monitor for presence of anoptical code in an imaging space proximate the user device. Based ondetecting an optical code, the PDS software and/or other software canperform the process of FIG. 6 in part or in whole. In accordance withaspects of FIG. 6, optical codes are imaged using a camera of a device(such as a wearable device) to obtain data of the optical code(s). Thedevice used to image the optical codes may be different from a device onwhich the application is launched and displayed. In one specificexample, the user has a wearable device on which the PDS is running anda separate device, such as a smartphone, on which the application forauthentication is launched.

An optical code can include computer-readable encoded information (whichmay also be in a form recognizable by users), and the data of theoptical code can include decoded data that is decoded from the encodedinformation of the optical code. The optical code(s) used in aspectsdescribed herein may be displayed on a display device in associationwith the application to be authenticated as being a legitimateapplication. The application may be a mobile application (one running ona mobile device), a web application, or any other type of application tobe authenticated as being a legitimate application. By legitimateapplication is meant another, trustworthy application that the launchedapplication (being authenticated) represents itself to be. On the basisof obtaining the optical code(s) and performing processing describedherein, the processing makes a determination as to whether the launchedapplication is authenticated as being the legitimate application, and anindication of that determining is provided.

With reference now to FIG. 6, based on launch of the application anoptical code is displayed. The process obtains this static optical code(602) and proceeds to determine whether that static optical code isvalid (604), i.e. what is expected to be presented by the legitimateapplication. This may be determined by identifying whether the staticoptical code conveys a user identity registered with a trustedauthentication entity associated with the legitimate application asbeing a proper user identity for the user. In some examples the trustedauthentication entity is a remote device. Additionally or alternatively,the trusted authentication entity could be the device that obtained thestatic optical code data, such as a wearable device of the user.

If it is determined that the obtained static optical code is not valid,then, based on this, an indication is provided to the user (618)indicating that the application is not authenticated as being thelegitimate application. In a specific example where the static opticalcode is expected to convey the user identity registered with the trustedauthentication entity of the legitimate application, then based on thestatic optical code failing to convey the user identity registered withthe trusted authentication entity of the legitimate application, it isdetermined that the application to be authenticated is not authenticatedas being the legitimate application and the provided indicationindicates that the application to be authenticated is not authenticatedas being the legitimate application.

In a scenario where the static optical code is valid, for instance itconveys the user identity registered with the trusted authenticationentity, then this provides a provisional indication of authenticity ofthe application, which may be subject to modification after a furtherdetermination of authenticity of the application is performed. Thefurther determination may be based on obtaining dynamically generatedsecond optical code data, as described below.

Thus, if it was determined at (604) that the static optical code isvalid, then the process continues by determining whether a secondoptical code is detected, for instance by imaging the display of thedevice on which the application is launched. The legitimate applicationis configured to present a dynamic optical code, which may be based ondynamically generated optical code data provided to the legitimateapplication. Therefore, it is determined whether a second optical codedetected (606) and, if no second optical code is detected within a giventimeframe, then the process proceeds to indicate that the applicationwas not authenticated as being the legitimate application (618).

If instead a second optical code is detected, then the second opticalcode is obtained (608) (if not already fully obtained) by, for example,imaging the second optical code as it is displayed on the display devicein association with the application to be authenticated. Meanwhile,separate from obtaining the second optical code, the device of the userobtains dynamically generated optical code data (610). This dynamicallygenerated optical code data may also be provided to the legitimateapplication by way of a trusted authentication entity associated withthe legitimate application in order to facilitate the authentication asdescribed herein.

Obtaining the dynamically generated data can in some examples includereceiving the dynamically generated optical code data from a trustedauthentication entity, which may be a remote device. In other examples,obtaining the dynamically generated optical code data includes thedevice of the user (notifying device) generating this data. In any case,the trusted authentication entity provides the dynamically generatedoptical code data to the legitimate application. In the case where thedevice of the user (notifying device) generated the dynamicallygenerated optical code data, then it can provide this dynamicallygenerated optical code data to the trusted authentication entity forprovision to the legitimate application.

The process of FIG. 6 continues by comparing data of the second opticalcode to the obtained dynamically generated optical code data (612). Thecomparison determines whether the two match, and therefore whether thesecond optical code is valid (614). If the comparing indicates amismatch between the data of the second optical code and the dynamicallygenerated optical code data, then it is determined that the secondoptical code is invalid. This indicates that the second optical code wasnot dynamically generated based on the dynamically generated opticalcode data provided to the legitimate application. Consequently, thelaunched application to be authenticated is not authenticated as beingthe legitimate application, based on the fact that the dynamicallygenerated optical code data was provided to the legitimate application(which is configured to receive that and display a dynamic optical codein response) and based on the fact that the launched application failedto display, on the display device and in association with theapplication to be authenticated, a dynamically generated optical codedynamically generated based on the dynamically generated optical codedata. An appropriate indication is provided to the user (618) and theprocess ends.

In instead at (614) it is determined that the second optical code isvalid, then the application is authenticated as being the legitimateapplication (616). Thus, if the comparing (612) indicates a matchbetween the data of the second optical code and the dynamicallygenerated optical code data, it indicates that the second optical codeis a dynamically generated optical code generated based on thedynamically generated optical code data that was provided to thelegitimate application. The launched application to be authenticated isauthenticated as being the legitimate application based the fact thatthe dynamically generated optical code data was provided to thelegitimate application and based on the fact that the launchedapplication displayed, on the display device and in association with theapplication to be authenticated, the dynamically generated optical codedynamically generated based on the received dynamically generatedoptical code data. An appropriate indication is therefore provided tothe user (618) and the process ends.

The provided indication of whether the application to be authenticatedis authenticated as being the legitimate application can be anyappropriate indication to apprise the user of the authentication, orlack thereof, of the launched application. As examples, an indicationcan include visual, haptic, and/or audible indication(s) for the user.As described herein, such indication can be provided beginning at anypoint in the process in order to provide a continuous indicator to theuser as to the status and/or outcome of the legitimacy authentication.As an example, when the process of FIG. 6 is performed, an initialindication of non-authentication (e.g. red light) is given to the userbut is subject to modification based on the final outcome of theprocessing. The notifying device may provide a red light indication toindicate that authentication is being performed for a launchedapplication by has not yet been authenticated as being the legitimateapplication, and that red light might change to green assuming theapplication is authenticated as being the legitimate application.

Processes described herein may be performed by one or more computersystems. In some examples, such a computer system that performsprocess(es) described herein is a computer system that is part of,includes, or uses a flexible display or apparatus into which theflexible display is incorporated. In other examples, a remote computersystem in communication with such computer system performs process(es)described herein. As a third possibility, a combination of the (i)computer system including/using the flexible display and (ii) remotecomputing system(s) perform process(es) described herein.

FIG. 7 depicts one example of a computer system to incorporate and useaspects described herein. A computer system may also be referred toherein as a processing device/system or computing device/system, orsimply a computer. Computer system 700 may be based on various systemarchitectures such as those offered by International Business MachinesCorporation (Armonk, N.Y., USA), Intel Corporation (Santa Clara, Calif.,USA), or ARM Holdings plc (Cambridge, England, United Kingdom), asexamples.

Computer system 700 is suitable for storing and/or executing programcode and includes at least one processor 702 coupled directly orindirectly to memory 704 through, e.g., a system bus 720. In operation,processor(s) 702 obtain from memory 704 one or more instructions forexecution by the processors. Memory 704 may include local memoryemployed during actual execution of the program code, bulk storage, andcache memories which provide temporary storage of at least some programcode in order to reduce the number of times code must be retrieved frombulk storage during program code execution. A non-limiting list ofexamples of memory 704 includes a hard disk, a random access memory(RAM), a read-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-onlymemory (EPROM or Flash memory), an optical fiber, a portable compactdisc read-only memory (CD-ROM), an optical storage device, a magneticstorage device, or any suitable combination of the foregoing. Memory 704includes an operating system 705 and one or more computer programs 706,for instance programs to perform aspects described herein.

Input/Output (I/O) devices 712, 714 (including but not limited todisplays, s, microphones, speakers, accelerometers, gyroscopes,magnetometers, light sensors, proximity sensors, GPS devices, cameras,etc.) may be coupled to the system either directly or through I/Ocontrollers 710.

Network adapters 708 may also be coupled to the system to enable thecomputer system to become coupled to other computer systems, storagedevices, or the like through intervening private or public networks.Ethernet-based (such as Wi-Fi) interfaces and Bluetooth® adapters arejust examples of the currently available types of network adapters 708used in computer system.

Computer system 700 may be coupled to storage 716 (e.g., a non-volatilestorage area, such as magnetic disk drives, optical disk drives, a tapedrive, etc.), having one or more databases. Storage 716 may include aninternal storage device or an attached or network accessible storage.Computer programs in storage 716 may be loaded into memory 704 andexecuted by a processor 702 in a manner known in the art.

The computer system 700 may include fewer components than illustrated,additional components not illustrated herein, or some combination of thecomponents illustrated and additional components. Computer system 700may include any computing device known in the art, such as a mainframe,server, personal computer, workstation, laptop, handheld or mobilecomputer, tablet, wearable device, telephony device, network appliance,virtualization device, storage controller, etc.

FIG. 8 depicts another example of a computer system to incorporate anduse aspects described herein. FIG. 8 depicts an example eyewear gadgetwearable device. Device 800 can include many of the same types ofcomponents included in computer system 700 described above. In theexample of FIG. 8, device 800 is configured to be wearable on the headof the device user. The device includes a display 802 that is positionedin the line of sight of the user when the device is in operativeposition on the user's head. Suitable displays can utilize LCD, CRT, orOLED display technologies, as examples.

Device 800 also includes touch input portion 804 that enable users toinput touch-gestures in order to control functions of the device. Suchgestures can be interpreted as commands, for instance a command to takea picture, or a command to launch a particular service. Device 800 alsoincludes button 806, in order to control function(s) of the device.Example functions include locking, shutting down, or placing the deviceinto a standby or sleep mode.

Various other input devices are provided, such as camera 808, which canbe used to capture images or video. The camera can also be used by thedevice to obtain an image of the user's view of his or her environmentto use in, for instance, capturing an image of a display of anothercomputer system being used by the user and/or a determination of thecurrent context under which services of the device are executing orattempting to be executed. One or more microphones, proximity sensors,light sensors, accelerometers, speakers, GPS devices, and/or other inputdevices (not labeled) may be additionally provided, for instance withinhousing 810. Housing 810 can also include other electronic components,such as electronic circuitry, including processor(s), memory, and/orcommunications devices, such as cellular, short-range wireless (e.g.Bluetooth), or WiFi circuitry for connection to remote devices. Housing810 can further include a power source, such as a battery to powercomponents of device 800. Additionally or alternatively, any suchcircuitry or battery can be included in enlarged end 812, which may beenlarged to accommodate such components. Enlarged end 812, or any otherportion of device 800, can also include physical port(s) (not pictured)used to connect device 800 to a power source (to recharge a battery)and/or any other external device, such as a computer. Such physicalports can be of any standardized or proprietary type, such as UniversalSerial Bus (USB).

Referring to FIG. 9, in one example, a computer program product 900includes, for instance, one or more computer readable storage media 902to store computer readable program code means, logic and/or instructions904 thereon to provide and facilitate one or more embodiments.

The present invention may be a system, a method, and/or a computerprogram product. The computer program product may include a computerreadable storage medium (or media) having computer readable programinstructions thereon for causing a processor to carry out aspects of thepresent invention.

The computer readable storage medium can be a tangible device that canretain and store instructions for use by an instruction executiondevice. The computer readable storage medium may be, for example, but isnot limited to, an electronic storage device, a magnetic storage device,an optical storage device, an electromagnetic storage device, asemiconductor storage device, or any suitable combination of theforegoing. A non-exhaustive list of more specific examples of thecomputer readable storage medium includes the following: a portablecomputer diskette, a hard disk, a random access memory (RAM), aread-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROMor Flash memory), a static random access memory (SRAM), a portablecompact disc read-only memory (CD-ROM), a digital versatile disk (DVD),a memory stick, a floppy disk, a mechanically encoded device such aspunch-cards or raised structures in a groove having instructionsrecorded thereon, and any suitable combination of the foregoing. Acomputer readable storage medium, as used herein, is not to be construedas being transitory signals per se, such as radio waves or other freelypropagating electromagnetic waves, electromagnetic waves propagatingthrough a waveguide or other transmission media (e.g., light pulsespassing through a fiber-optic cable), or electrical signals transmittedthrough a wire.

Computer readable program instructions described herein can bedownloaded to respective computing/processing devices from a computerreadable storage medium or to an external computer or external storagedevice via a network, for example, the Internet, a local area network, awide area network and/or a wireless network. The network may comprisecopper transmission cables, optical transmission fibers, wirelesstransmission, routers, firewalls, switches, gateway computers and/oredge servers. A network adapter card or network interface in eachcomputing/processing device receives computer readable programinstructions from the network and forwards the computer readable programinstructions for storage in a computer readable storage medium withinthe respective computing/processing device.

Computer readable program instructions for carrying out operations ofthe present invention may be assembler instructions,instruction-set-architecture (ISA) instructions, machine instructions,machine dependent instructions, microcode, firmware instructions,state-setting data, or either source code or object code written in anycombination of one or more programming languages, including an objectoriented programming language such as Smalltalk, C++ or the like, andconventional procedural programming languages, such as the “C”programming language or similar programming languages. The computerreadable program instructions may execute entirely on the user'scomputer, partly on the user's computer, as a stand-alone softwarepackage, partly on the user's computer and partly on a remote computeror entirely on the remote computer or server. In the latter scenario,the remote computer may be connected to the user's computer through anytype of network, including a local area network (LAN) or a wide areanetwork (WAN), or the connection may be made to an external computer(for example, through the Internet using an Internet Service Provider).In some embodiments, electronic circuitry including, for example,programmable logic circuitry, field-programmable gate arrays (FPGA), orprogrammable logic arrays (PLA) may execute the computer readableprogram instructions by utilizing state information of the computerreadable program instructions to personalize the electronic circuitry,in order to perform aspects of the present invention.

Aspects of the present invention are described herein with reference toflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus(systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of theinvention. It will be understood that each block of the flowchartillustrations and/or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in theflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, can be implemented bycomputer readable program instructions.

These computer readable program instructions may be provided to aprocessor of a general purpose computer, special purpose computer, orother programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, suchthat the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computeror other programmable data processing apparatus, create means forimplementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or blockdiagram block or blocks. These computer readable program instructionsmay also be stored in a computer readable storage medium that can directa computer, a programmable data processing apparatus, and/or otherdevices to function in a particular manner, such that the computerreadable storage medium having instructions stored therein comprises anarticle of manufacture including instructions which implement aspects ofthe function/act specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram blockor blocks.

The computer readable program instructions may also be loaded onto acomputer, other programmable data processing apparatus, or other deviceto cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer,other programmable apparatus or other device to produce a computerimplemented process, such that the instructions which execute on thecomputer, other programmable apparatus, or other device implement thefunctions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or block diagram block orblocks.

The flowchart and block diagrams in the Figures illustrate thearchitecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementationsof systems, methods, and computer program products according to variousembodiments of the present invention. In this regard, each block in theflowchart or block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portionof instructions, which comprises one or more executable instructions forimplementing the specified logical function(s). In some alternativeimplementations, the functions noted in the block may occur out of theorder noted in the figures. For example, two blocks shown in successionmay, in fact, be executed substantially concurrently, or the blocks maysometimes be executed in the reverse order, depending upon thefunctionality involved. It will also be noted that each block of theblock diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, and combinations of blocksin the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustration, can be implementedby special purpose hardware-based systems that perform the specifiedfunctions or acts or carry out combinations of special purpose hardwareand computer instructions.

The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particularembodiments only and is not intended to be limiting. As used herein, thesingular forms “a”, “an” and “the” are intended to include the pluralforms as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It willbe further understood that the terms “comprises” and/or “comprising”,when used in this specification, specify the presence of statedfeatures, integers, steps, operations, elements, and/or components, butdo not preclude the presence or addition of one or more other features,integers, steps, operations, elements, components and/or groups thereof.

The corresponding structures, materials, acts, and equivalents of allmeans or step plus function elements in the claims below, if any, areintended to include any structure, material, or act for performing thefunction in combination with other claimed elements as specificallyclaimed. The description of one or more embodiments has been presentedfor purposes of illustration and description, but is not intended to beexhaustive or limited to in the form disclosed. Many modifications andvariations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art. Theembodiment was chosen and described in order to best explain variousaspects and the practical application, and to enable others of ordinaryskill in the art to understand various embodiments with variousmodifications as are suited to the particular use contemplated.

What is claimed is:
 1. A method comprising: obtaining, based on imagingat least one optical code using a camera of a device of a user, data ofthe at least one optical code, the at least one optical code beingdisplayed on a display device in association with an application to beauthenticated for the user as being a legitimate application; obtaining,by the device of the user separate from obtaining the data of the atleast one optical code, dynamically generated optical code data, thedynamically generated optical code data also provided to the legitimateapplication by way of a trusted authentication entity associated withthe legitimate application; comparing data of one optical code of the atleast one optical code to the obtained dynamically generated opticalcode data; automatically determining, based on the obtained data of theat least one optical code, whether the application to be authenticatedis authenticated as being the legitimate application, wherein theautomatically determining authenticity of the application is based onthe comparing; and providing for the user, by the device of the user,based on the automatically determining, an indication of whether theapplication to be authenticated is authenticated as being the legitimateapplication.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the at least one opticalcode comprises a first optical code displayed based on a launch of theapplication to be authenticated, wherein the automatically determiningcomprises identifying whether the first optical code conveys a useridentity registered with a trusted authentication entity associated withthe legitimate application as being a proper user identity for the user,and wherein the provided indication of the authenticity of theapplication is based at least in part on whether the first optical codeconveys the user identity registered with the trusted authenticationentity associated with the legitimate application.
 3. The method ofclaim 2, wherein based on the first optical code failing to convey theuser identity registered with the trusted authentication entity of thelegitimate application, the automatically determining determines thatthe application to be authenticated is not authenticated as being thelegitimate application and the provided indication indicates that theapplication to be authenticated is not authenticated as being thelegitimate application.
 4. The method of claim 2, wherein theidentifying whether the first optical code conveys the user identityregistered with the trusted authentication entity provides a provisionalindication of authenticity of the application, the provisionalindication subject to modification after a further determination ofauthenticity of the application, the further determination based on theobtaining the dynamically generated optical code data which is alsoprovided to the legitimate application for display of the dynamicallygenerated optical code in association with the legitimate application.5. The method of claim 1, wherein the obtaining the dynamicallygenerated optical code data by the device of the user comprisesreceiving the dynamically generated optical code data from the trustedauthentication entity, wherein the device of the user images the oneoptical code as it is displayed on the display device in associationwith the application to be authenticated in order to obtain the data ofthe one optical code for comparison to the dynamically generated opticalcode data.
 6. The method of claim 1, wherein the obtaining thedynamically generated optical code data comprises generating, by thedevice of the user, the dynamically generated optical code data, andwherein the method further comprises: providing by the device of theuser the generated dynamically generated optical code data to thetrusted authentication entity for provision to the legitimateapplication, wherein the device of the user images the one optical codeas it is displayed on the display device in association with theapplication to be authenticated in order to obtain the data of the oneoptical code for comparison to the obtained dynamically generatedoptical code data.
 7. The method of claim 1, wherein the comparingindicates a match between the data of the one optical code and thedynamically generated optical code data, the match indicating that theone optical code is a dynamically generated optical code generated basedon the dynamically generated optical code data provided to thelegitimate application, and that the application to be authenticated isauthenticated as being the legitimate application, based on provision ofthe dynamically generated optical code data to the legitimateapplication and based on the display, on the display device and inassociation with the application to be authenticated, of the dynamicallygenerated optical code dynamically generated based on the dynamicallygenerated optical code data.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein thecomparing indicates a mismatch between the data of the one optical codeand the dynamically generated optical code data, the mismatch indicatingthat the one optical code was not dynamically generated based on thedynamically generated optical code data provided to the legitimateapplication, and that the application to be authenticated is notauthenticated as being the legitimate application, based on provision ofthe dynamically generated optical code data to the legitimateapplication and based on a failure to display, on the display device andin association with the application to be authenticated, a dynamicallygenerated optical code dynamically generated based on the dynamicallygenerated optical code data.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein thedevice comprises a wearable device, the application to be authenticatedcomprises a mobile application or a web application, and the indicationcomprises at least one visual, haptic, or audible indication for theuser.
 10. The method of claim 1, wherein the at least optical codecomprises computer readable encoded information and the data of the atleast one optical code comprises decoded data decoded from the encodedinformation.
 11. The method of claim 1, wherein the method furthercomprises triggering, during boot of the device of the user, checking adigital signature of an application of the device of the user, and,based on verifying the digital signature as being correct, initiatingexecution of the application, wherein the application at least partiallyperforms the obtaining, the automatically determining, and theproviding.
 12. The method of claim 1, wherein an application running asa background application of the device of the user monitors for presenceof an optical code in an imaging space proximate the device of the user,and wherein the obtaining, the automatically determining, and theproviding are performed based on detecting presence of the optical code,the optical code being an optical code of the at least one optical code.13. A computer program product comprising: a non-transitory computerreadable storage medium readable by a processor and storing instructionsfor execution by the processor for performing a method comprising:obtaining, based on imaging at least one optical code using a camera ofa device of a user, data of the at least one optical code, the at leastone optical code being displayed on a display device in association withan application to be authenticated for the user as being a legitimateapplication; obtaining, by the device of the user separate fromobtaining the data of the at least one optical code, dynamicallygenerated optical code data, the dynamically generated optical code dataalso provided to the legitimate application by way of a trustedauthentication entity associated with the legitimate application;comparing data of one optical code of the at least one optical code tothe obtained dynamically generated optical code data; automaticallydetermining, based on the obtained data of the at least one opticalcode, whether the application to be authenticated is authenticated asbeing the legitimate application, wherein the automatically determiningauthenticity of the application is based on the comparing; and providingfor the user, by the device of the user, based on the automaticallydetermining, an indication of whether the application to beauthenticated is authenticated as being the legitimate application. 14.The computer program product of claim 13, wherein: the at least oneoptical code comprises a first optical code displayed based on a launchof the application to be authenticated; the automatically determiningcomprises identifying whether the first optical code conveys a useridentity registered with a trusted authentication entity associated withthe legitimate application as being a proper user identity for the user,wherein the identifying whether the first optical code conveys the useridentity registered with the trusted authentication entity provides aprovisional indication of authenticity of the application, theprovisional indication subject to modification after a furtherdetermination of authenticity of the application, the furtherdetermination based on obtaining the dynamically generated optical codedata which is also provided to the legitimate application for display ofthe dynamically generated optical code in association with thelegitimate application; and the provided indication of the authenticityof the application is based at least in part on whether the firstoptical code conveys the user identity registered with the trustedauthentication entity associated with the legitimate application and atleast in part on the further determination of authenticity of theapplication.
 15. The computer program product of claim 13, wherein thecomparing indicates a match between the data of the one optical code andthe dynamically generated optical code data, the match indicating thatthe one optical code is a dynamically generated optical code generatedbased on the dynamically generated optical code data provided to thelegitimate application, and that the application to be authenticated isauthenticated as being the legitimate application, based on provision ofthe dynamically generated optical code data to the legitimateapplication and based on the display, on the display device and inassociation with the application to be authenticated, of the dynamicallygenerated optical code dynamically generated based on the dynamicallygenerated optical code data.
 16. A computer system comprising: a memory;and a processor in communications with the memory, wherein the computersystem is configured to perform a method, the method comprising:obtaining, based on imaging at least one optical code using a camera ofa device of a user, data of the at least one optical code, the at leastone optical code being displayed on a display device in association withan application to be authenticated for the user as being a legitimateapplication; obtaining, by the device of the user separate fromobtaining the data of the at least one optical code, dynamicallygenerated optical code data, the dynamically generated optical code dataalso provided to the legitimate application by way of a trustedauthentication entity associated with the legitimate application;comparing data of one optical code of the at least one optical code tothe obtained dynamically generated optical code data; automaticallydetermining, based on the obtained data of the at least one opticalcode, whether the application to be authenticated is authenticated asbeing the legitimate application, wherein the automatically determiningauthenticity of the application is based on the comparing; and providingfor the user, by the device of the user, based on the automaticallydetermining, an indication of whether the application to beauthenticated is authenticated as being the legitimate application. 17.The computer system of claim 16, wherein: the at least one optical codecomprises a first optical code displayed based on a launch of theapplication to be authenticated; the automatically determining comprisesidentifying whether the first optical code conveys a user identityregistered with a trusted authentication entity associated with thelegitimate application as being a proper user identity for the user,wherein the identifying whether the first optical code conveys the useridentity registered with the trusted authentication entity provides aprovisional indication of authenticity of the application, theprovisional indication subject to modification after a furtherdetermination of authenticity of the application, the furtherdetermination based on obtaining the dynamically generated optical codedata which is also provided to the legitimate application for display ofthe dynamically generated optical code in association with thelegitimate application; and the provided indication of the authenticityof the application is based at least in part on whether the firstoptical code conveys the user identity registered with the trustedauthentication entity associated with the legitimate application and atleast in part on the further determination of authenticity of theapplication.
 18. The computer system of claim 16, wherein the comparingindicates a match between the data of the one optical code and thedynamically generated optical code data, the match indicating that theone optical code is a dynamically generated optical code generated basedon the dynamically generated optical code data provided to thelegitimate application, and that the application to be authenticated isauthenticated as being the legitimate application, based on provision ofthe dynamically generated optical code data to the legitimateapplication and based on the display, on the display device and inassociation with the application to be authenticated, of the dynamicallygenerated optical code dynamically generated based on the dynamicallygenerated optical code data.